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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME III. OCTOBER, 1928 NuMBER 4
THE PERMISSIBILITY OF COiMENT ON THE DEFEND-
ANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN BEHALF
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
When the question as to whether or not a prosecuting attorney
should be permitted to comment on the failure of the accused in a
Criminal action to testify in his own behalf first arose in the state
of Washington, the Supreme Court rested its decisioin denying
the right to make such comment on a statute.2 The abrogation 3 of
this statute by the Supreme Court under its rule-making power,'
leaves this question of vital importance in criminal practice open
and undecided in this State.
The statute referred to formerly provided in substance that the
accused in a erininal case could offer himself as a witness in his
own behalf, thereby subjecting himself to the usual rules of law
relating to cross-examination, and further provided
"that nothing in this code shall be construed to compel
such accused person to offer himself or herself as a wit-
ness in such case And promded further, that it shall be
the duty of the court to nstruct the jury that no inference
of guilt shall arise against the accused if the accused shall
fail or refuse to testify as a witness -i his or her own be-
half ", (Italics ours)
The Supreme Court in its decision in the case of State v. Smoka-
lent, merely said in relation to the question, that the statute im-
State v. Smokalem, 37 Wash. 91, 79 Pac. 603 (1905).
'Rem. Comp. Stat. (Wash., 1922), Sec. 2148.
2Rule IX, sec. 1, 140 Wash. XXXV..
4 Laws 1925, Ch. 118, Sec. 1, providing in substance that the Supreme
Court shall have power to make rules for the simplification of pleading,
practice, and procedure of the -courts of the state and all laws in conflict
with such rules shall be nullified.
'See Note 2, supra. The italicized portion was abrogated by the recent
rule cited in Note 3.
'See Note 1, supra.
Referring to Rem. Comp. Stat. (Wash., 1922), Sec. 2148.
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posing a duty on the court to instruct that no inference arose
against the defendant by reason of his failure to testify, prohibited
by implication the prosecuting attorney as an officer of the court
from commenting on such failure.
Now, with the italicised proviso of the quoted section gone, there
arises the question whether or not, in the absence of any statute
affecting the matter, comment by the prosecutor on the defendant's
silence in a criminal trial violates the defendant's constitutional
privilege8 against compulsory self-incrimination.
HISTOICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION
Before considering the scope of the constitutional privilege from
compulsory self-incrimination, a short investigation of the com-
mon law privilege is both interesting and necessary for a proper
understanding of the question. Since the growth of the common
law privilege took place over a period of over 400 years, only a
slight resume can be given in this discussion.
It may suffice to say that the privilege grew up as a reaction
against the oath "yusyurandem de veritate dicenda" or inquisition-
al oath introduced into England by ecclesiastical courts in the
late 1300's to replace trial by ordeal and compurgation.9 The mis-
use of this oath by these courts and by the common law courts
which also undertook the punishment of Protestants under the
Stuarts aroused great public indignation, 0 for the use of the oath
degenerated into a mere inquisitional process used to probe into
the individual's private thoughts to find something chargeable.
During the Reign of Charles I, his courts found the use of this
oath very efficacious in destroying his political enemies by trea-
son charges and in obtaining his "forced loans. 112 Not only was
the oath used, but it was augmented by bullying and extreme tor
ture 3 in even such modern times as to be transferred for certain
uses to the colonies. 4  Such persecution brought on the revolution
8 WASH. CONST. Art. 1, Sec. 9.
9 1 POLL. & MAIT., HIST. OF ENG. LAW (1905) 425.11 2 COBBET, PARL. HIST., 722.
" 3 Car. I, C. 1, s. 1-3, 10 (1627)
11 STEPHENS, HIST. OF CRI.EW LAW, 325 and Felton's Case, 3 How St. Tr.
371 (P C., 1628).
14 Mass. Body of Liberties 1641 (Whitmore's Ed.) s. 45, "No man shall
be forced by torture to confess any crime against himself nor any other
unless it be in some capital case where he is first fully convicted by clear
and sufficient evidence to be guilty After which, if the cause be of that
nature, that it is apparent there be other conspirators or confederates with
him, then he may be tortured, yet not such tortures as be barbarous and
unhumane."
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of 1648, ending in the beheading of Charles I, the establishment of
the Commonwealth and the destruction of everything the Stuarts
had used in their oppression.
The courts of the Commonwealth now decided that compulsory
self-incrimination was not permissible in criminal trials."5 Next
the courts of the Protectorate recognized the privilege in civil
cases."' Though the Stuarts were again restored, their evil prac-
tices were gone forever, the liberties gained were extended, and
the privilege against self-incrimination was now recognized to in-
elude all witnesses.' 7
The growth of the privilege was not, then, accidental, 8 but rather
it was the reaction to centuries of tyranny, persecution and tor-
ture, recogmzed as an essential element of fair criminal procedure,
springing from the Anglo-Saxon repugnance to oppression and
expressing that people's ideal of fairness, equity, and justice.
The privilege was so well entrenched in the common law by 1689
that it did not appear in the Bill of Rights of that year,19 but a
hundred years later suddenly appears in the American Constitu-
tion.20 Since it did not appear in the earlier constitutions it may
be supposed that the idea of the necessity of writing it into the
Constitution came from clamour raised by the French Constitution-
al Assembly, 2- against compulsory self-incrimination just before
our Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution. It is probable
that our delegates to France after the Revolution, seeing the danger
of oppression by the use of compulsory self-incrimination and re-
membering the violation of individual rights under the British
Writs of Assistance, had the privilege written into our so-called
Bill of Rights as protection against the then fearsome central gov-
ernment. Moreover, the privilege has been so highly regarded that
'Lilburi's Trial, 4 How. St. Tr. 1269 (1649).
The Protector v. Lord Tumley, Hard. 22 (1655).
17 Bcrogg's Trial, 5 How. St. Tr. 1034 (1660) "You are not bound to an-
swer me, but if you will not, we must prove it." Reading's Trial, 7 How. St.
Tr. 259 (1679).
I STEPnxN'S HiST. CRim. LAW, 342.
:T btd. 325.
o U. S. CoNsT. Amend. V The history of the privilege is quite fully dis-
cussed in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97,
in which it was assumed for the purpose of argument only, but not decided
that comment by a judge on the failure of the accused to testify violated the
privilege.
'4 WIeioni , EVIDBNCE (2nd od., 1923) 817, n. 112.
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it has been expressly written into the constitution of every state
in the Union save those of Iowa2- and New Jersey
THE SCOPE AND POLICY OF THE PRIVILEGE
An investigation into the scope and policies of the privilege will
be necessary to determine whether comment on its exercise violates
its purposes.
From the view-point of the individual, the privilege exists to
protect his private life, freedom, and independence to protect him
from inquisitional grilling relative to every act that might, to an
officious investigator, seem indicative of some unlawful intent.
It exists also to protect him from investigations of the police third
degree type which easily lead to barbarous practices.
Society and the state itself are also interested in the promulga-
tion of the privilege, for without it the prosecuting system may
come to rely on evidence obtained by examining the defendant,2 3
the tendency progressively being, first, to seek an incriminating
answer, next, to demand it, and ultimately, to force it by bullying,
which readily leads to the use of physical force and torture such
as reputedly sometimes used in "third degrees"
With this back-ground, it may be said generally that the func-
tion of the privilege, generally stated, is to guarantee to the indi-
vidual that he will not be forced, by positive present act or word
to furnish, produce, or make evidence to be used against himself. -2 4
THE COMPETENCY ACTS
At common law until very recent times the accused could not
testify at his own trial,25 being disqualified because of interest,
though of course, his confession could be received, and prior to the
establishment of the privilege he could be examined to obtain a
confession. This disqualification was universal until 1864 when
Maine passed the first competency act,2 6 followed since then by
= Iowa guarantees the privilege by statute: Iowa Code 1924, Sec. 13891,
and has also held that it is included in the "due process" clause of the
Constitution. State v. Height, 117 Ia. 650, 91 N. W 935 (1902). However,
such opinion is unsound in the face of the opposite holding of the U. S.
Supreme Court in Twining v. New Jersey, Note 20, supra.
2 "Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust
habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself
suffer morally thereby" 1 WIGMAORE ,op. cit. supra, Note 21, 472, Sec. 225.
-"Use of footprints, articles found on the accused, and voluntary state-
ments are not necessarily exceptions to this statement since they come
under the head of real evidence. State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 35 Pac.
382 (1893) State v. Barela, 23 N. M. 395, 168 Pac. 545, L. R. A. 1918B, 844(1917) and note; 28 L. R. A. 699.
' He could since early times make an unsworn statement to the jury
5 Minn. L. Rev 390, 553.
-'Me., Stat. 1864, c. 280, "-the person so charged shall at his own
requests, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness."
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all the states of the Union save Georgia. Thus, the right of the
accused to testify dates back less than 75 years and exists only by
virtue of statutory or constitutional provision. This fact coupled
with the one that almost all such statutes while qualifying the
defendant to testify, provide against comment, 27 explains the dearth
of decisions on the point in question.
These competency acts were not passed with any intent of limit-
mg the extent of the privilege but only for the purpose of adding
a further privilege of testifying if the defendant desired. As
stated by the Virgiia Supreme Court
"The sole purpose of this enactment, it is obvious, was to
give the accused, who alone could know the true state of
the case and the explanation of its many exculpatory cir-
cumstances, the opportunity to testify or not as bis inter-
ests might dictate.' '28
In order to avoid any possibility of the competency acts limiting
the privilege, every state in the Union, with the exception of
Georgia, New Jersey, South Carolina and Washington, to which
Ohio now may be added,2 9 provides in the statute granting com-
petency that the failure of the accused to testify shall not create
any inference or presumption against him. This latter clause,
though varying slightly in phraseology in some states, is generally
construed to prevent comment by either court or prosecutor.3 0 Of
this group of states only New. Jersey2 ' has come to allow comment
on the failure to exercise the right to testify, and it has no consti-
tutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
The constitution of Washington guarantees the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in the following words
"No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
give evidence against himself or be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense."
32
A statute of the state grants to the accused the right to testify
as any other witness, subjects him to cross-examination, and furth-
er provides that
"Nothing in this code shall be construed to compel such
"See Note 30, infra.
"sPrice 'v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 393 (1883)
"Ohio amended constitution in 1912 to allow comment. Orno CoNST.
Art. I, Sec. 10.
104 Wiouo, op. cit. supra Note 21, Sec. 2272, p. 900, footnote 4, Wil-
son v. U. S., 149 U. S. 60, 13 Sup. Ct. 765, 37 L. Ed. 650 (1893) State v.
Garrngton, 11 S. D. 178, 76 N. W 326 (1898) Commonwealth v. Scott, 123
Mass. 239, 25 Am. Rep. 87 (1877).
" See Note 59, inlra.
2WAsH. CONST., Art. 1, See. 9.
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accused person to offer himself or herself as a witness in
such case. 3
That remaining silent, even though allowed to testify, is not in-
consistent with innocence has been often said. The Supreme Court
of the United States does so in the following language
"It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness
stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him.
Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and at-
tempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character,
and offences charged against him, will often confuse and
embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than
remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, how-
ever honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on
the witness stand. The statute, in tenderness to the weak-
ness of those who from the causes mentioned might refuse
to ask to be a witness, particularly when they may have
been in some degree compromised by their association with
others, declares that the failure of the defendant in a
criminal action to request to be a witness shall not create
any presumption against him."
3 4
Again it has been said
"It may be quite natural to infer that an accused remains
silent because he cannot truthfully deny the charges, but
there are other possible and not improbable explanations.
An innocent man might consider it wiser to remain silent
rather than to be compelled to disclose suspicious circum-
stances which would probably outweigh his denial, or,
though innocent of the offense in question, he might be
compelled to disclose a more serious crime.""
EFFECT OF COMMENT ON THE SILENCE OF THE AccusED
If comment is allowed on the silence of the accused he is placed
in a true dilemma, for if he exercises his privilege not to testify the
prosecutor draws an inference of guilt from this fact, whereas, if,
to avoid this, he testifies, he thereby waives his privilege in this
state 6 and in most other jurisdictions. True, he has a choice, but
the choosing between two horns of a dilemma cannot be the exercise
of true option, 3' nor does it seem that the exercise of a constitution-
al right should prove such a trap or place one in such a predica-
ment.
The result which would flow from holding comment permissible
has been thus expressed
13 See Note 2, supra.
11 Wilson v. U. S., Note 30, supra.
'MHINTO,, CASES ON EVIDENCE. (1919) p. 239, footnote.
6 Cf. State v. O'Hara, 17 Wash. 526, 50 Pac. 477 (1897) State v. Peoples,
71 Wash. 451, 458, 129 Pac. 108 (1912) State v. Crowder 119 Wash. 450,
205 Pac. 850 (1922) State v. Ulsemer 24 Wash. 657, 64 Pac. 800 (1901).
"' WmaORE, op. cit. supra Note 21, 894, Sec. 2272.
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"This (competency) law, while intended to confer a
benefit on the accused, places him in a peculiar position.
If he does make the request, and takes the stand, his testi-
mony will be the subject of those tests on cross-examin-
ation that may prove embarrassing, and detract largely
from its weight as evidence. If, on the other hand, his
failure to take the stand on his own behalf can ever be
called to the attention of the jury, the provision intended
for his benefit would prove a trap and a snare.""8
The effect of waiver of the privilege by taking the stand in this
state reveals the real danger to the accused when placed in this
predicament. He may be cross examined as any other witness, 9
he may be charged with admitting all the evidence adduced
against him that he fails to deny by his own testimony 0 and his
credibility may be attacked in any manner even to the extent of
introducing prior convictions of any crime.41 The state may also
show that his reputation for truth is bad 2 and may request an in-
struction that the interest of the accused discredits the weight of
his testimony 43
If comment is permitted, it does not seem probable that the ac-
cused could safely choose the other horn of the dilemma and re-
main silent in the face of the prosecutor's right to comment, for
the prosecutor having the last statement to the jury could easily
leave the impression with that body that silence on the part of
the defendant is itself conclusive of his guilt.
If comment is permissible, the ultimate result is inescapable,
-the accused must take the stand, and, thereby waiving his priv-
ilege entirely, subject himself to all the dangers and pitfalls of
cross-examination set out heretofore. As so aptly stated by the
California Supreme Court
"Now if, at the trial, when for all purposes of the trial,
the burden is on the people to prove the offense charged
by affirmative evidence, and the defendant is entitled to
rest on his plea of not guilty, an inference of guilt can be
legally drawn from his declining to go upon the stand as
a witness, and again deny the charge against him in the
form of testimony, he would practically if not theoretic-
ally, by his act in declining to exercise his privilege, fur-
nish evidence of his guilt that might turn the scale and con-
State v. Garrngton, Note 30, supra.
"State v. Crowder Note 36, supra.
,0 State v. McCormick, 127 Wash. 288, 220 Pac. 808 (1923).
"Rem. Comp. Stat. (Wash. 1922), Sec. 2290, and State V. Turner, 115
Wash. 170, 196 Pac. 638 (1921).
"State v. Fredlander 141 Wash. 1, 250 Pac. 453 (1926)
"State v. McCann, 16 Wash. 249, 47 Pac. 443 (1896).
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vict him. In this mode he would indirectly and practi-
cally be deprived of the option which the law gives him. "44
If it is conceded then, and there seems no escape from so doing,
that allowing comment forces the accused to testify, the constitu-
tional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is clearly
violated, for the privilege of the accused includes freedom from
testifying at all, since nothing but questions relative to or leading
to his guilt could be asked him. This fact is acknowledged by uni-
versal practice and procedure.
4 5
True it is that the accused is not compelled to testify by process
of law, which distinction is mistakenly drawn in England ;46 but
he is nevertheless compelled with the full force and effect of that
word, whether he takes the stand in response to summons by the
state or by force of an incriminating inference which such a state
of the law would permit the state to draw by virtue of his not testi-
fying.
No distinction is made in the application of the rule holding
forced confessions inadmissible no matter what kind of force is
used to extort them. When it is remembered that the same policies
and reasons, the protection of the individual and the morals of the
prosecuting system are the basis of both rules, it is difficult to
see why such a distinction should be made in one case and not in
the other, especially when the privilege against self-incrimination
is a constitutional right and the other only a rule of evidence.
To allow comment by the prosecutor, is to violate the policies
of the privilege, no matter which means of escape the accused
chooses from the position in which he is placed thereby If he
testifies, waiving his privilege, the prosecution may soon come
to depend on the incriminating statements or confessions resulting
from the cross-examination, or the discrediting facts revealed in
the attack on credibility, while, if the accused chooses to remain
silent the prosecution will rely strongly on the inference of guilt
which it will deduce from this circumstance.
THE ANALOGY OF THE RULE GOVERNING OTHER PRIVILEGES
Since the other evidentiary privileges such as that between
phvsician and patient, attorney and client and husband and wife
are similar in nature to the privilege in question, the almost uni-
versal holding, that the exercise of such privilege is not the proper
44People v. Tyler 36 Cal. 522 (1869).
15 5 WVIGMORE, op. cit. supra Note 21, Sec. 3134.
41Kopps v. Regia (1894). App. Cases 650; Queen v. Rhodes [1899] 1
Q. B. 77, 68 L. J. 83, 79 L. T. 360, 62 J. P 774, 47 W R. 121.
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subject of comment,47 should be of some considerable weight in the
decision of the principal problem.
The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is interesting
on the question of comment on the exercise of the privilege be-
tween physician and patient
"If the plaintiff had the legal right to have this testimony
excluded, she could exercise that right without making it
the subject of comment for the jury ',48
It is interesting also to note that the reason given for denying com-
ment in each case, is, that to allow comment is to destroy the
privilege.49 Certainly the same reasoning applies in the case of the
privilege in question and certainly, also, a constitutional privilege
is entitled to at least as much consideration as a mere common law
or statutory privilege.
TiE DECISIONS ON THE QuESTION
As has been stated, 0 due to statutory provisions against com-
ment on the accused's failure to testify, but few states have had
the opportunity to pass on the question, in the absence of statute.
The California case51 is the leading case. It was decided in 1869
just after the Califoria competency act went into effect. That
act enabled the defendant to testify if he chose, but it did not con-
tam the usual clause that his failure to testify should not create
any presumption against him. Thus the California act of 1866 is
in substance exactly the same as the present Washington statute
now that the new rule has stripped off the quoted words italicised
at the beginning of this article. There being no express provision
against comment or inference, there arose in California then, as
there arises here now, squarely the question whether, in the absence
of any statute forbidding it directly or inferentially, comment by
the prosecutor on the defendant's failure to take the stand violated
the constitutional provision against self-incrimination-a provision
identical with the one in this state.52 The California case denied
the prosecutor the right to comment in these words
'
T Comment on the exercise of privilege between physician and patient
not permissible. Lane v. Spokane Falls & Northern R?. B. Go., 21 Wash.
119, 57 Pac. 367, 46 L. R. A. 152 (1900). Same as to privilege between
attorney and client. Wentworth v. Lloy, 10 H. L. Cas. 589 (1864) Trav-
elers Ins. Co. v. Pomerantz, 214 Misc. 250, 207 N. Y. S. 81. Same as to
privilege between husband and wife. Zumwalt v. State, 16 Ariz. 82, 141
Pac. 710 (1914) Mash v. People, 220 Ill. 86, 77 N. E. 92 (1906). State v.
Taylor, 57 W Va. 228, 50 S. E. 247 (1905).
"Lane v. Spokane Falls & N. R. R. Co., supra Note 40.
"Note 40, supra.
1 See main text relating to Notes 27 and 30, supra.
5 See Note 44, supra, California has since also covered the point by
code. Cal. Penal Code, Sec. 1323.
rCATi. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 13.
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"-In this mode [if comment were allowed] he would in-
directly and practically be deprived of the option which
the law gives him, and of the benefit of the provision of
the law and the Constitution, which say, in substance, that
he shall not be compelled to criminate himself " ". to
permit such an inference would be to violate the princi-
ples and the spirit of the Constitution and the statute,
and defeat, rather than promote the object designed to
be accomplished by the innovation [allowing accused to
testify] in question."
"We are of opinion, therefore, that the Court erred in
permitting the District Attorney to pursue the line of
argument to which objection and exception were taken,
and intimating its approbation of the ground taken, and
especially after what had transpired, in refusing the in-
struction asked on behalf of defendant for the purpose of
correcting any erroneous view that might have been im-
pressed on the minds of the jury We think such instruc-
tion proper in all cases where the defendant desires it.""
Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia also denied comment
with the same course of reasoning.5 4
To these decisions may be added the language of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in a decision denying the prosecu-
tor the right to comment, as follows
"The statutes clearly recognize their (accused
persons) constitutional privilege by providing that their
failure to testify shall not create any presumption against
them. "'5
This Massachusetts case, while predicated on a statute expressly
preventing any presumption of guilt arising from the failure to
testify, appears to regard this cautionary clause as merely declara-
tory of the necessary consequence of the constitutional privilege,
to-wit, that no inference or comment could be made. In other
words, the presumption clause adds nothing, but is merely included
to make it clear and express that the legislature did not by the
competency statute infringe in any way upon the constitutional
privilege. If this is true, the prohibition against comment would
seem to flow directly from the constitution and not from the purely
declaratory statute.
In a minority of common law jurisdictions, comment has been al-
"People v. Tyler Note 44, supra.
"Price v. Com., 77 Va. 393 (1883) State v. Howard, 35 S. C. 197, 14
S. E. 48 (1892) Bird v. State, 50 Ga. 585 (1874) Coleman v. State, 15 Ga.
App. 398, 83 S. E. 154 (1914).
' Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239, 25 Am. Rep. 87 (1877). See
also Berg v. Pentilla, 217 N. W 935 (Minn. 1928) Note 12 Minn. L. Rev.
555.
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lowed-Maine, New Jersey, and England-though it is only in
Maine that the question arose as to the effect of comment in the
face of a constitutional privilege against self-inerimiation, and
it has since changed its holding by statute.56 The rule m Maine5"
is based on a supposed analogy to the rule of admission by silence
and conduct. The Maine rule seems erroneous for the reason that
the accused must be under a duty to deny accusations before his
silence can imply an acqiescence in them,"8 and if the privilege has
any effect at all it would be to remove that duty
The New Jersey decisions are based on the same line of reason-
mg59 as those from Maine and therefore fall into the same error.
New Jersey has, however, refused to go so far as to allow an in-
struction authorizing the jury to draw an "irresistible" infer-
ence of guilt from the defendant's silence6 0
When the question arose in England under the limited compe-
tency act of 1885 making the defendant in certain criminal
charges "competent but not compellable" to give evidence6l the
trial judge's comment on the defendant's silence was sustained 2
on the basis that "competent but not compellable" must have the
same meaning in this case as, in the statute affording the defendant
in a civil case the right to testify, and that there the words not
compellable had been construed to mean not compellable by process
of law ;63 so that since comment did not compel the defendant by
process of law, it was pernssible.
The question cannot be so summarily disposed of. The different
situation of the defendant in a crimnal case and a civil case is
alone enough to render the analogy between the civil competency
and crimnal competency statutes inaccurate. The closer and more
accurate analogy would be to the rule on the admissibility of con-
fessions wherein any force, legal, physical, mental, or moral ren-
ders the confession inadmissible.
The full criminal competency act passed in England in 1898
specifically provides that the prosecutor can make no comment,
64
but the right of the judge to comment has been maintained on
afe. Rev. Stat. 1916, c. 136, Sec. 19.
"State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867).
O3JoEs, EvimScE, Sec. 1044.
"Parker v. State, 65 N. J. L. 308, 39 Aft. 651 (1898)
0State v. Wines, 65 N. J. L. 36, 46 Atl. 702 (1900).
a' 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99.
OKopps v. Regina, supra Note 39.
"Bartlett v. Lew-is, 12 C. B. N. S. 249 (1862).
461 & 62 Vict. c. 36, Sec. lb.
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his general power to sum up the evidence and on the inaccurate
reasoning of Knopps case."
The three jurisdictions whose decisions have been discussed
above are the only jurisdictions save one66 that have been found
allowing any comment on the defendant's silence at the trial, while
he was protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
67 It
must be recognized that in each case the comment is by the trial
judge by virtue of his duty to sum up the evidence to the jury m
those jurisdictions, a thing specifically forbidden by the constitu-
tion of the state of Washington.6
The reasoning of the cases from those jurisdictions is at least
questionable and appears to be wholly incompatible with the
existence of the privilege at least as constitutionally guaranteed
in this state.
OTHER PHASES OF THE PRIVILEGE.
Though statutes have generally prevented the question of com-
ment on the claim of the privilege by the accused from arising, the
courts have had an opportunity to pass on the question as to
whether or not the defendant can be put in a position by request
for incriminating documents as to have to claim the privilege openly
and thus give rise to inferences of guilt or at least of the incriminat-
ing character of the documents withheld. The rule of the Federal
courts69 and most other courts 6 seems to be that the defendant
shall not, by the exercise of his constitutional right to be forced to
give evidence against himself, be placed in such a position.
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that the state can-
not, by demanding in open court that the accused produce docu-
ments alleged to be incriminating, force the accused to claim the
privilege and thus give rise to adverse inference in the eyes of
the jury
"The reasoning to sustain this principle lies in this
that the state is not put to the necessity, neither will it be
permitted to put an inference of guilt which necessarily
Regina v. Rhodes, supra Note 39, Kirkham's Case, 2 Cr. App. R. 253
(1909) Hampton's Case, 2 Cr. App. R. 274 (1909).
" Ohio. It is significant that it was deemed necessary to amend the
constitution to allow comment. See Note 29, supra.
17 A possible exception to this statement may be found in State v. Gar-
ret, 44 N. C. 358 (1853), where the prosecutor was allowed to draw an
inference of the truth of a question which a witness refused to answer on
the ground that it was incriminating.
"WASH. CONST. Art. IV Sec. 16.
0 McKnight v. U. S., 155 Fed. 972 (1902) Hibbard v. U. S., 172 Fed. 66,
18 Ann. Cas. 1040 (1909).
'o Gillespie v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 546, 115 Pac. 620, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1171 (1911).
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flows from an imputation that the accused person has sup-
pressed or is withholding evidence, when the constitution
provides that no person shall be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself The demand is futile except
to put the defendant in a false light before the jury and
compel him to defend himself against iferences arising
from a collateral circumstance and to the stress of extri-
eating lmself from a position in which the constitution
says he shall not be placed The fact that a witness
may be compelled to answer to the jury for something
that could not be introduced directly, is in itself enough to
sustain the protective clauses of the constitution. "71
This is a clear holding that not only may the state not draw an
inference from the claim of the privilege but further it may not
put the defendant in such a position that he must openly claim the
privilege. If the reasoning is sound in this case the same holding
should be made as to the defendant not testifying orally
While it is true that some courts7 2 have held that in csvit cases
where a party to the action asserts his privilege against self-
incrimination, a logical inference may be drawn from his silence
in so far as such silence bears on the civil issues involved in that
case, even the adoption of this view does not directly defeat the
real purpose of the privilege, which is merely to protect a witness
from being required to disclose information which may lead to his
crinnal prosecution or conviction. In a civil case his criminal
guilt is not in issue, whereas in a crminal proceeding it is the
very issue in the case. Hence the effect of comment is totally
different in the two cases. Even in civil cases there is a strong
authority73 against comment on the exercise of the privilege, on
the ground that it is an indirect curtailment of the privilege, and
tends to nullify it.
On the question as to the implied acquiescence in accusations
or admission of them by silence, it is held that no such acquiescence
or admission is implied unless the accusations are made in such a
manner that the accused is under a duty to deny them.7 4  Almost
all jurisdictions hold that when the defendant is in custody of the
law he is under no duty to answer accusations because of the
privilege against compulsory self-incrnmnaton.
75
"State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 195 Pac. 470 (1915).
72Morris v. McClellan, 154 Ala. 639, 45 So. 641, 16 Ann. Cas. 305 (1908)
Morgan v. Kendall, 124 Ind. 454, 24 N. E. 149, 9 L. R. A. 445.
Carne v. Litchlield, 2 Mich. 340 (1852) Berg V. Pentilla, Note 55,
supra, where many authorities are collected.
7' See Note 58, supra.
"Hauger v. U. S., 173 Fed. 54 (1909) Vaughan v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. 685,
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The same reasoning, it seems logical, would prevent any infer
ence arising from silence during trial, for if the privilege protects
the accused during the preliminary proceedings of arrest and
arraignment it should do the same at the trial.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, it would seem that to allow the prosecutor to make
an adverse comment on the accused's failure to testify is an in-
fraction of his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, first, because it practically forces the accused to
take the stand and testify as a witness, which is the very thing
the constitution says he cannot be forced to do, and second, because
permitting such comment on the exercise of a privilege nullifies
that privilege and places a privilege guaranteed by the constitution
in a position in which the courts have not allowed even ordinary
evidentiary privileges to be placed.
If it be claimed that the inference of guilt from the failure of
the accused to testify is a natural and logical one, the answer
would seem to be that there are also other permissible inferences
consistent with innocence, and that, in any event, the constitution
forbids the inference to be drawn. Since he is under no duty to
speak, the silence of the accused according to well settled principles
should not be used against him.
Of the few states that have had the opportunity to pass on the
permissibility of such comment, a clear majority have held against
it, and the Supreme Court of Washington has flatly held that no
inference should arise from the exercise of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination when it is exercised by withholding in-
criminating documents, and has also held that analogous privileges
are not subject to comment.
So far as the effect of the new court rule in this state is con-
cerned, which abolishes what was theretofore a mandatory require-
127 Pac. 264 (1911) State v. Hillstrom, 46 Utah 341, 150 Pac. 935 (1915)
State v. Epstein, 25 R. I. 131, 55 Atl. 204 (1903; "It is clearly the right
and privilege of a party in such circumstances to remain silent, and the
fact that he does so ought not to be used against him." Parrot v. State,
125 Tenn. 1, 139 S. W 1056, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073 (1911) Bell v. State,
93 Ga. 557, 19 S. E. 244 (1894) State v. Mullins, 101 Mo. 514, 14 S. W 625
(1890) State v. Hale, 156 Mo. 162, 56 S. W 881 (1900) Comstock v. State,
14 Neb. 205, 15 N. W 355 (1883) Maloney v. State, 91 Ark. 585, 121 S. W
728 (1909) Com. v. Zorambo, 205 Pa. 109, 54 Atl. 716 (1903) Broyles v.
State, 47 Ind. 251 (1874).
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ment of the trial judge to instruct that no inference of guilt should
arise from the failure to testify, it would seem that the only effect
of the new rule is to remove the mandate. If the Califormae6
view is adopted, which, unaffected by any statute, is based on a
constitutional provision like ours and which we may have obtained
from California as there construed,7 7 it is plain that the constitu-
tional privilege against self-mcrnination in and of itself prevents
the prosecutor from commenting on the silence of the accused and,
moreover, entitles the accused to an instruction on the point if he
requests it. In other words, it is in the state of Washington since
the adoption of the new court rule no longer the mandatory duty
of the court to give the instruction whether requested or not,78 but
it must probably still be given if requested by the accused. While
the Supreme Court of Washington has not under all circumstances
reversed judgments where comments have been made by the prose-
cutor on the silence of the accused, 7 it seems a fair supposition that
the court will not permit the constitutional guaranty against self-
merinination to be broken down by permitting a prosecutor to drive
the accused to the stand through the possession of the power of
comment, notwithstanding the fact that the prosecutor is as yet
denied direct legal process to compel the accused to testify
There seems no other possible conclusion but that such comment
by the prosecutor cannot be allowed without practically nullifying
a right firmly entrenched in the common law since the seventeenth
century and redeclared and guaranteed by virtually all the Ameri-
can constitutions,-a right which in its fundamental fairness to
," See Note 44, supra, and main text at Note 53, supra.
" 12 C. J. 717.
"State v. G(ustavson, 87 Wash. 613, 152 Pac. 335 (1915).
10State v. Raub, 103 Wash. 214, 173 Pac. 1094 (1918), discussed in Spo-
kane v. Roberts, 132 Wash. 568, 232 Pac. 316 (1925). See also State -V.
Fitzenberger, 140 Wash. 308, 248 Pac. 799 (1926), where the court held that
a statement by the prosecutor to the jury that the testimony of the state
was not denied, when no one could have denied it except the accused who
did not take the stand, was not an unlawful comment on the silence of the
accused-a statement which it would seem in a most pointed and artful
way, without expressly doing so, called the attention of the jury to the
fact that the accused had not taken the stand.
The doctrine espoused in State v. Raub, supra, that an unlawful com-
ment by the prosecutor can be cured by an appropriate instruction seems
objectionable if the violation of a constitutional right is involved, as it
appears to be. As a matter of fact, the third from the last paragraph in
Spokane v. Roberts, supra, says that the comment of the Prosecutor was
"prejudicial error." If so, it would seem to be an error not curable by an
instruction, and the court appears to say so. At any rate the language
referred to in the Spokane v. Roberts, supra, seems to cast some doubt on
whether State v. Raub would be adhered to.
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the accused causes the American system of the administration of
justice to stand out above other systems in other parts of the
world, whatever may be the defects in our criminal procedure in
other matters.
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